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Studying Ourselves: The Academic 
Labor Market 
Presidential Address to the Society of Labor 
Economists, Baltimore, May 3, 2002 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Cornell University 
I. Introduction 
The study of academic labor markets by economists goes back at least 
to Adam Smith’s suggestion in The Wealth of Nations that a professor’s 
compensation be tied to the number of students that enrolled in his 
classes.1 This article focuses on three academic labor market issues that 
students at Cornell and I are currently addressing: the declining salaries 
I am grateful to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the Atlantic Philan-
thropies (USA) Inc. for their support of the Cornell Higher Education Research 
Institute (CHERI), which has provided me with the opportunity to work on 
many of the issues discussed in this article. Without implicating them for anything 
that remains, I am also grateful to Orley Ashenfelter, Charles Clotfelter, Daniel 
Hamermesh, Edwin Mills, Derek Neal, John Pencavel, and numerous colleagues 
at Cornell for their comments on an earlier draft. Much of the research that I 
report on in this article is being conducted jointly with a number of Cornell 
undergraduate and graduate students, including Christopher Smith, Michael 
Rizzo, Andy Nutting, Liang Zhang, Dan Klaff, and Mathew Nagowski, and I 
am much appreciative of all of their assistance 
1
 Adam Smith (1976), pp. 282-84. These pages are from bk. V, chap. 1, pt. III, 
article II, “Of the Expense of Education of Youth.” 
[Journal of Labor Economics, 2003, vol. 21, no. 2] 
© 2003 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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of faculty employed at public colleges and universities relative to the 
salaries of their counterparts employed at private higher education insti-
tutions, the growing dispersion of average faculty salaries across academic 
institutions within both the public and private sectors, and the impact of 
the growing importance and costs of science on the academic labor market 
and universities. To introduce these topics, I first briefly survey the rea-
wakening of economists’ interest in academic labor markets, which lay 
dormant for almost 2 centuries after Smith. 
Projections of future shortages of faculty in the United States made 
during the 1970s led to a revival of scholarly interest in the academic 
labor market and, more specifically, in the determinants of the number 
of Ph.D.’s granted by American universities (Cartter 1976). In a series of 
important papers and books written in the 1970s, Richard Freeman de-
veloped cobweb models of the supply of professionals and his models 
subsequently were extended by others to incorporate various assumptions 
about the role of cohort size and expectations about the future time path 
of professionals’ salaries.2 
To adequately model the supply side of the academic labor market 
requires much more complicated models. One needs to consider the de-
terminants of undergraduates’ choice of majors, the determinants of the 
flows of college graduates to Ph.D. study from different majors both 
directly after graduation and with a delay, the determinants of Ph.D. 
students’ time to degree and completion rates, the changing role and 
lengths of postdoctoral appointments, the decision by new Ph.D.’s to 
accept academic employment rather than nonacademic employment, the 
flow of Ph.D.’s from the academic to the nonacademic sectors and vice 
versa, and the retirement behavior of faculty. While research has been 
conducted on many of these topics during the last 30 years, our knowledge 
about many of them remains very imprecise.3 
What is also imprecise is our knowledge of the determinants of the 
supply of foreign students to Ph.D. study and the role of foreign Ph.D.’s 
in the academic labor market. When I received my Ph.D. degree in 1970 
only about 11.4% of all new Ph.D.’s and 18.6% of new Ph.D.’s in ec-
onomics granted by American universities went to foreign students (stu-
dents on temporary visas); in 2000 the comparable figures were 28.9% 
and 49.4%.4 Foreign students make up an even larger share of new Ph.D.’s 
in some science and engineering fields, and they and their countrymen 
who received their Ph.D.’s outside of the United States also make up a 
2
 See, e.g., Freeman (1971, 1975), Hoffman and Low (1983), Siow (1984), and 
Stapleton (1989). 
3
 Much of the research through the early 1990s on these topics is summarized 
in Ehrenberg (1991, 1992). Ehrenberg and Mavros (1995) study the determinants 
of time-to-degree and completion rates. 
4
 These figures come from WebCaspar. 
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large share of all postdoctoral fellows working on biomedical research in 
the United States (National Research Council 1998). Foreign residents’ 
ability to enter the country for study, let alone to stay and work in the 
United States either temporarily or permanently, depends upon both em-
ployment opportunities in the United States and other nations and our 
immigration policies. 
While concern has been expressed by some that the growth in the 
number of foreign Ph.D. students has been at the expense of underrep-
resented minority groups in the United States, the one study that examined 
this subject found that the best U.S. Ph.D. programs tend to discriminate 
against foreign students and in favor of underrepresented minority stu-
dents in their admissions process (Attiyeh and Attiyeh 1997). That is, 
holding measures of applicant quality such as GRE scores constant, for-
eign students were less likely to be admitted to these programs, and 
underrepresented minority students more likely to be admitted, than other 
U.S. citizen applicants. 
The late 1980s saw the publication of an important book by William 
Bowen and Julie Ann Sosa that focused on the demand side of the aca-
demic labor market and presented projections of a forthcoming shortage 
of faculty in arts and science disciplines (Bowen and Sosa 1989). My 
critique of the Bowen and Sosa book (Ehrenberg 1991) pointed out that 
their projections were based on a number of strict assumptions, the re-
laxation of any one of which could substantially alter their results.5 One 
key assumption was that the student/tenure track doctorate faculty ratio, 
which had declined during the 1980s, would not increase in the future. 
However, it did increase during the 1990s, as American institutions of 
higher education increased their reliance on part-time and adjunct faculty 
members. This, along with tremendous inflows of foreign graduate stu-
dents, kept the market for new faculty in balance. For example, between 
1987 and 1998, the proportion of faculty members employed part-time 
in the United States rose from 33% to 42% (Wilson 2001). As a result, 
real salaries of faculty did not increase substantially during the 1990s, 
which one might have expected to observe if shortages of new Ph.D.’s 
were materializing. 
Why has the use of part-time and non-tenure-track faculty grown so 
rapidly in the United States? This growth flies in the face of models of 
prestige-maximizing academic institutions employed by a number of 
economists to explain the “arms race of spending” that is taking place in 
selective private higher education.6 A major reason for the growing use 
of part-time and non-tenure-track faculty is that the ability of a large 
5
 Ehrenberg (1991). See National Research Council (2000) for a more recent 
critique of projection models of the demand for doctoral scientists and engineers. 
6
 See, e.g., Winston (1999) and Ehrenberg (2000). 
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fraction of American higher education institutions to generate the reve-
nues necessary to pay for higher salaries for tenure track faculty is greatly 
limited. 
The vast majority of American college and university students attend 
public higher education institutions, and thus the vast majority of Amer-
ican professors are employed in these institutions. State appropriations 
to their public higher education institutions have not kept up with ex-
penditure per student growth in private higher education during recent 
decades because of several recessions, because of the increased priority 
being placed on other uses of state tax revenues (such as elementary and 
secondary education, health, welfare, and criminal justice), and because 
of the pressure to reduce, rather than increase, state income and sales tax 
rates. In addition, in many states governors and state legislatures firmly 
are committed to the belief that in-state tuition should be kept low, which 
limits another major source of revenue for public higher education 
institutions. 
As a result, the salaries of faculty in public higher education institutions 
have declined relative to the salaries of faculty in private higher education 
institutions over the last 2 decades. For example, in the fall of 1978, the 
average salary of professors at public research and doctorate-granting 
institutions was 9 1 % of the average salary of professors at private research 
and doctorate-granting institutions. By 1993, this ratio had fallen to 79%, 
and it has hovered around that level ever since. 
The declining public/private academic salary ratio in the United States 
is well known and has been discussed in several places.7 What is less 
recognized is that within both the public and private academic labor 
market sectors an increase in the dispersion of average faculty salaries 
across universities has also taken place. As figure 1 indicates, the variance 
of the logarithm of average real full professor salaries across universities 
increased between 1978 and 2001 in both the public and private sectors, 
and similar trends have been observed for associate professor (fig. 2) and 
assistant professor (fig. 3) salaries. Moreover, the increasing dispersion of 
faculty salaries across academic institutions is not confined to the major 
research universities. As figure 4 indicates, the variance across institutions 
in the logarithm of average real faculty salaries increased between 1973 
and 1998 at all ranks in private liberal arts colleges as well. 
II. Changing Public/Private Faculty Salary Differentials 
The forces behind the decline in the average salaries of professors in 
public universities relative to the average salaries of professors in private 
universities are easy to identify. The weighted average real state appro-
7
 See, e.g., Bell (2000), Ehrenberg (2000, chap. 2), Alexander (2001), Hamermesh 
(2002), and Zoghi (2003). 
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FIG. 1.—R1 full professor variance of log salary 
priation per full-time-equivalent (FTE) student at public research uni-
versities remained roughly constant between 1985 and 1997.8 While some 
publics sought to increase their tuition levels at percentage rates that 
exceeded the percentage rates of increase of private tuitions, they were 
starting from a much lower absolute level and thus their real tuition level 
per student increased in absolute terms less than did the real tuition levels 
of their private counterparts. Not surprisingly, then, the real expenditure 
FIG. 2.—R1 associate professor variance of log salary 
8
 The statistics that follow come in large part from the NSF WEBCASPAR 
system. Weighted average real state appropriations per student actually declined 
between 1988 and 1993 and then rose in real terms between 1993 and 1998. It is 
this latter increase that partially explains why the average salaries of professors 
at public research universities did not decline relative to their private counterparts’ 
salaries after 1993. 
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FIG. 3.—R1 assistant professor variance of log salary 
per FTE student gap between public and private research and doctoral 
institutions has widened considerably since 1979. 
In work in progress, Andrew Nutting and I have estimated the loga-
rithm of average salary equations, by rank, separately for public and 
private institutions using panel data that span the 1973–98 period. Our 
models include as explanatory variables endowment per student, tuition 
(in-state tuition for the publics) and state appropriations per student, as 
well as institutional fixed effects. We find that over 60% of the change 
in the ratio of average public to average private professor salary at each 
rank between 1973 and 1998 can be explained by differences in the change 
in real tuition levels in the two sectors. The preoccupation with percentage 
rates of growth of tuition has led observers to forget that unless state 
FIG. 4.—Liberal arts colleges variance of log salary 
Presidential Address 273 
appropriations per student increase at a rate of 2%–3% a year above the 
rate of inflation, which is the rate at which historically private tuition 
growth has exceeded inflation, public tuition increases that are less in 
dollar terms than private tuition increases almost guarantee that faculty 
salaries at public higher education institutions will fall further behind 
those of their counterparts employed at private institutions.9 
The decline in the ratio of public university professors’ salaries relative 
to private university professors’ salaries surely makes it more difficult for 
public universities to hire and retain top faculty, especially at the senior 
level.10 Anecdotal stories abound about public universities being raided 
by privates for their young tenured faculty members. In one recent year, 
the University of Arizona, whose average faculty salaries at each rank 
were about at the mean of the average salaries across all public research 
and doctoral universities, lost 75 faculty members to other institutions in 
spite of the efforts it made to retain them with counteroffers (Smallwood 
2001). 
National data on the turnover rates of tenured faculty are not readily 
available. However, each year the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) collects, as part of its survey of academic salaries, 
institutional level data on the numbers of full-time faculty in each rank 
in the previous year that the institution also employs in the current year, 
regardless of what their ranks are in the current year.11 Subject to some 
qualification, this permits one to compute a continuation rate for faculty 
members in each rank in each institution.12 The continuation rate, or, 
more precisely, one minus the continuation rate, for assistant professors 
cannot be used as a measure of voluntary turnover as some assistant 
9
 Bowen (1968) showed that tuition levels at a set of major private research 
universities outpaced the rate of inflation by an average of 2%–3% a year for the 
first two-thirds of the twentieth century, and Ehrenberg (2000, chap. 1) presents 
evidence that the trend continued during the last third of the century. 
10
 Dan Hamermesh informed me that in preliminary work he found no evidence 
that the increasing salary gap between public and private research universities led 
to a systematic decline in the number of public institutions ranked among the 
top 5 or 10 in the arts and science and engineering fields between the 1980s and 
1990s National Research Council (NRC) studies of faculty quality. However, 
when Nutting and I regressed the change in an economics department’s NRC 
faculty quality rating between the 1980s and 1990s on its 1980s faculty quality 
rating and the percentage change in average full professor salary at the institution 
between 1982 and 1993, we found for institutions ranked in the top half of 
economics Ph.D. programs in the 1980s that higher salary growth was associated 
with a greater increase in the faculty quality rating. 
11
 This means, e.g., that faculty members who are associate professors in one 
year who are promoted to full professor in the second year are counted as con-
tinuing associate professors in the second year. 
12
 These qualifications relate to the treatment of faculty who are serving as 
administrators or who are on leave in either the current or previous year. 
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professors leaving an institution may do so because they are involuntarily 
leaving because they have been denied tenure. The continuation rate for 
professors is “contaminated” by faculty departures due to retirement, 
disability, and death. The continuation rate of associate professors, most 
of whom are tenured faculty, comes closest to approximating a voluntary 
retention rate. 
When Hirsch Kasper, Dan Rees, and I used the AAUP continuation 
rate data for the 1988–89 academic year, we found that, other factors held 
constant, institutions with higher continuation rates tended to have higher 
average faculty salaries than their competitors. Moreover, the magnitude 
of this relationship was largest for research and doctoral institutions (Eh-
renberg, Kasper, and Rees 1991). So, given the falling ratio of the average 
salary of professors at public research and doctoral universities to the 
average salary of professors at private research and doctoral universities 
that had taken place by the early 1990s, it is reasonable to expect that the 
private institutions would have lower voluntary turnover rates and thus 
higher associate professor continuation rates than their public university 
counterparts during the decade of the 1990s. 
The AAUP has provided Matthew Nagowski and me with institutional 
level data that have permitted us to compute continuation rates annually 
for associate professors at research and doctoral institutions during the 
decade of the 1990s. The weighted (by faculty size) and unweighted av-
erage continuation rates for a set of institutions that were in the sample 
in each year appear in figure 5. It is not surprising, given the gap between 
average salaries in the two sectors, that the average continuation rate for 
associate professors at private research and doctoral institutions did exceed 
the average continuation rate for associate professors at public research 
and doctoral institutions in every year.13 
III. The Growing Dispersion in Average Faculty Salaries 
The causes of the growing dispersion in the logarithm of average faculty 
salaries across institutions differ for private and public institutions. Our 
models attribute the vast majority of the growing dispersion across private 
institutions to the growing dispersion of endowment wealth. To under-
stand why this is true, it is important to realize that even if two institutions 
experience the same percent increase in endowment per student during a 
period of time, the institution that has the highest initial level of endow-
ment per student will gain more absolutely in endowment per student 
13
 The associate professor rank is not a tenured rank at some private research 
institutions and thus some departures of associate professors at the privates are 
involuntary. This strengthens the conclusion that voluntary turnover is higher at 
the public institutions. 
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FIG. 5.—Continuation rate of associate professors at private and public universities 
than the institution with the lower initial level of endowment per student.14 
If other sources of institutional income, such as tuition per student, are 
not growing at rates that are as high in percentage terms as the rate at 
which endowment per student is growing, the institution with the larger 
initial endowment per student will see its total income per student growing 
by a greater percentage than its relatively poorer counterpart. Thus, it 
will be able to increase its average faculty salary level by a greater per-
centage during the period. 
To illustrate why this is true, table 1 presents data relevant to the 
experience of two institutions, Princeton and Cornell, during the decade 
of the 1990s.15 For simplicity, I assume in this table that the only sources 
of income to support faculty salaries are tuition revenues and spending 
14
 See Ehrenberg and Smith (2001) for a more detailed discussion of this point. 
15
 Cornell is a very complex institution. Three of its undergraduate colleges, 
the statutory colleges, receive financial support from New York State and, in 
return, charge students from New York State much lower tuition levels. Faculty 
in these colleges have considerably lower average salaries than the average salaries 
of faculty in Cornell’s endowed, or private, colleges and it is the latter’s average 
salaries that are used in the comparisons below. Finally, a substantial share of 
Cornell’s endowment is “owned” by its medical college, which is located in New 
York City, and these assets cannot be used to finance faculty salaries on the Ithaca 
campus. If I had subtracted the endowments owned by Cornell’s medical and 
statutory colleges, the Cornell endowment-per-student figures would be about 
20% larger in both 1990 and 2000, but the increase would not be large enough 
to substantially alter my conclusions. 
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Table 1 
Hypothetical Comparison of Cornell’s and Princeton’s Spending per 
Student and Average Professor Salary Levels 
1990-91: 
July 1 endowment/student 
5% of July 1 endowment/ 
student 
Tuition 
Spending per student [(2)+ (3)] 
Average professor salary 
2000-2001: 
July 1 endowment/student 
5% of July 1 endowment/ 
student 
Tuition 
Spending per student [(2)+ (3)] 
Average professor salary 
Growth rates over the decade: 
Endowment (%) 
Tuition (%) 
Spending per student (%) 
Cornell 
51,000 
2,550 
15,164 
17,714 
71,500 
186,000 
9,300 
24,852 
34,152 
103,000 
265 
64 
93 
Princeton 
390,000 
19,500 
15,440 
34,940 
82,400 
1,323,000 
66,150 
25.430 
91,580 
125,700 
239 
65 
162 
Ratio (P/C) 
1.97 
1.15 
2.68 
1.22 
NOTE.—These comparisons are hypothetical because they assume that the institutions each spent 5% 
of the July 1 value of their endowments in each year and the comparisons ignore all sources of spending 
other than endowment and tuition income. 
from endowment.16 Princeton, which has the largest endowment per stu-
dent in the nation, saw its endowment per student grow from roughly 
$390,000 on July 1, 1990 to about $1,323,000 on July 1, 2000, an increase 
of about 240%. During the same period of time, Cornell’s endowment 
per student grew from about $51,000 to $186,000, an increase of over 
260%. So Cornell actually experienced a greater percentage rate of growth 
of its endowment per student during the period. 
Most academic institutions aim to spend roughly 5 % of the value of 
their endowment, averaged over a number of years, each year on current 
operations.17 To keep things simple, I further assume that during each 
academic year Cornell and Princeton each spent 5% of the value of its 
endowment as of July 1 of the year. With this assumption, Princeton’s 
endowment would have provided the institution with $19,500 to spend 
per student in 1990–91 and $66,150 per student to spend in 2000–2001, 
an increase of about $46,650 per student over the decade. In contrast, 
Cornell’s endowment would have provided it with spending of $2,550 
per student in 1990–91 and $9,300 per student in 2000–2001, an increase 
of $6,750 over the decade. In spite of the fact that Cornell’s endowment 
per student increased by a greater percentage than Princeton’s during the 
16
 I am ignoring other sources of revenue such as annual giving and research 
funding, but these omissions do not change my argument in any way. 
17
 Ehrenberg (2000, chap. 3) provides a discussion of why this is true. 
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decade, Cornell fell further behind Princeton in terms of the absolute 
number of dollars it had available to spend per student each year from 
its endowment. 
Why this is important is that the level of the other source of revenue, 
tuition revenue per student, was initially very similar at the two insti-
tutions and then grew at roughly the same rate during the decade, a rate 
that was much smaller than the rate of endowment growth. Cornell’s 
tuition grew from $15,164 to $24,852, an increase of 64%. Princeton’s 
tuition grew from $15,440 to $25,430, an increase of 65%. Because Prince-
ton’s spending from endowment comprised a much greater share of its 
spending in 1990–91 than did Cornell’s, and tuition at both institutions 
grew at a much slower rate than endowment wealth did during the decade, 
the net result of these changes was that Princeton’s total spending per 
student grew by 162% during the decade, while Cornell’s “only” grew 
by 93%. 
In this simple example, Princeton’s total spending per student was 1.97 
times Cornell’s total spending per student in 1990–91. By 2000–2001, this 
ratio had increased to 2.68. You thus should not be surprised to learn 
that while the average salary of full professors at Princeton was 15% 
higher than the average salary of full professors at Cornell in 1990–91, 
by 2000–2001 Princeton’s relative salary advantage had grown to 22%.18 
More generally, Nutting and my estimates suggest that at the professor, 
associate, and assistant professor levels, about 80%, 75%, and 85%, re-
spectively, of the increases in the variance of the logarithms of average 
real faculty salaries across private research universities that are displayed 
in figures 1–3 that are explained by our model are due to the growing 
inequality of endowment wealth across the private research universities 
during the period. For the private liberal arts colleges, the comparable 
percentages that can be explained by the growing inequality of endowment 
wealth are 95%, 100%, and 8 1 % for the three ranks. 
Our models suggest that for public research universities the growing 
variance in the logarithms of average real salaries is due both to growing 
endowment-per-student differences and growing differences in state ap-
propriations per student. However, for all three ranks, changes in en-
dowment per student play at best a minor role, never contributing more 
than 40% of the explained growing variance. Most of the increase in the 
18
 One might reasonably ask why the relative salary advantage of Princeton’s 
faculty did not grow still more. The answer undoubtedly is that Princeton also 
used the increases in the spending that its endowment was generating for other 
purposes, such as improving its undergraduate student financial aid packages, 
increasing the size of its graduate student stipends, reducing (relative to Cornell) 
its student/faculty ratio, improving the funding of its athletic programs, and, in 
the future, it will increase the size of its undergraduate student body and expand 
its graduate programs. 
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variances of the logarithm of average real faculty salaries across research 
institutions is due to growing differences in state appropriations per stu-
dent across these institutions. Indeed, for assistant and associate profes-
sors, virtually all of the explained increase in the variances in the logarithm 
of faculty salaries is due to this factor. 
The increased dispersion of average faculty salaries across institution 
in both the public and private sectors suggests that it is becoming in-
creasingly difficult for some institutions to attract and retain high-quality 
faculty. To the extent that faculty quality now differs more across insti-
tutions, where students go to college is likely to matter even more in the 
future than it has in the past.19 
IV. The Growing Importance and Cost of Science 
Scientific research has come to dominate many major American uni-
versity campuses, and this is reflected in the way that universities are 
ranked. U.S. News & World Report’s annual ranking of national univer-
sities as undergraduate institutions places heavy weight on the volume of 
external research funding that faculty members at universities receive (U.S. 
News & World Report 2001). The 1994 Carnegie Foundation classifi-
cation of Ph.D.-granting institutions into Research I, Research II, Doc-
toral I, and Doctoral II institutions was similarly heavily based on the 
institutions’ volumes of external research funding, and institutions strove 
mightily to increase their funding to receive a higher classification in the 
next Carnegie classification revision (Carnegie Foundation for the Ad-
vancement of Teaching [CFAT] 1994). Concerned that this behavior was 
causing universities to place too much weight on the volume of their 
faculty members’ external research and not enough weight on the quality 
of their graduate programs, the foundation collapsed its four Ph.D. cat-
egories into two in 2000 and based an institution’s new classification solely 
on the number of Ph.D.’s that the institution produced each year (CFAT 
2001). 
Viewed in terms of 1998 dollars, the weighted (by faculty size) average 
volume of total research and development expenditures per faculty mem-
ber across 228 American research and doctoral institutions doubled from 
roughly $70,000 per faculty member in 1971 to about $140,000 per faculty 
member in 1998.20 This growth in scientific research, which was driven 
by the availability of government, corporation, and foundation funding, 
does not derive primarily from the various ranking and classification 
schemes, but rather derives from the major advances being made in science 
and the importance of these advances to our society. To take an example, 
19
 See Eide, Brewer, and Ehrenberg (1998) and Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg 
(1999). 
20
 The figures that follow are all computed from the NSF WEBCASPAR system. 
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recent advances in decoding the human genome, in advanced materials, 
and in information sciences promise major advances in health care treat-
ments in the years ahead. Each university wants to be a leader in these 
fields so that it can attract top faculty and graduate and undergraduate 
students, as well as increased funding for its program, and, more recently, 
each wants to try to generate revenue from its faculty members’ research 
findings.21 
What many people do not recognize, however, is that in spite of gen-
erous external support for research, increasingly the costs of research are 
being borne by the universities themselves. During the same period of 
time, the weighted average institutional expenditures on research per fac-
ulty member at these institutions more than tripled. As a result, the 
weighted average percentage of total research expenditures per faculty 
member coming from institutional funds rose from about 1 1 % to 20%. 
Increasingly, academic institutions are bearing a greater share of the ever-
increasing costs of scientific research. 
As I have discussed in detail elsewhere, there are a number of forces 
that have led the costs of research borne by universities to soar over the 
past 3 decades (Ehrenberg 2000, chap. 6). Theoretical scientists, who in 
a previous generation required only desks and paper and pencil, now 
often require access to supercomputers. Experimental scientists increas-
ingly rely on sophisticated laboratory facilities that are expensive to build 
and operate. Research administration now includes strict monitoring of 
financial records and environmental safety, as well as the detailed review 
and monitoring of experiments involving human subjects. 
Historically, the federal government and other external funders through 
their provision of indirect cost recoveries have funded much of the costs 
of the research infrastructure that universities operate, as well as their 
research administration costs. Each institution was allowed to “mark up” 
the direct cost that its faculty members requested of external funders for 
their research funding by a multiple called the indirect cost rate, and the 
indirect cost revenues received on successful grant applications went to 
support the institution’s research administration and infrastructure costs. 
As figure 6 indicates, the average indirect cost rate across the 228 re-
search and doctorate institutions was about 50% in 1983, and this rose 
to about 51.5% in 1989. Then, in a well-publicized case involving Stanford 
University in the early 1990s, government auditors alleged that items some 
expenditures included in Stanford’s indirect costs were not legitimately 
21
 American universities and their faculty members collected over $1 billion 
dollars in revenues from the licensing of patents in fiscal year 2000. However, 
these revenues are concentrated in a few institutions; 90% of universities received 
less than $2 million and almost half received less than $1 million (Blumenstyk 
2002). 
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FIG. 6.—Indirect cost recovery rates at all research and doctoral institutions: 228 schools 
related to research, and that Stanford had overcharged the federal gov-
ernment for these costs by as much as $200 million to $400 million over 
a 10-year period.22 The two parties ultimately agreed to settle the dispute 
by Stanford repaying $1.5 million to the government and without its 
making any admission of wrongdoing. However, the damage had been 
done: auditors began to take a much harder look at universities’ requests 
for indirect cost recoveries and put caps on the percentages that insti-
tutions could claim for expenses in the various categories. As a result, the 
average indirect cost rate fell to about 49.5% in 1997. 
Averages can be misleading, however. As figure 7 indicates, in 1983 the 
average indirect cost rate at private research and doctoral universities was 
over 60%, while the average at public research and doctoral universities 
was about 45%.23 By 1997 the average private indirect cost rate had fallen 
to about 55%, while the average public indirect cost rate had risen slightly. 
So the decline in indirect cost rates was felt primarily by the private 
22
 See Kennedy (1997, pp. 164–75) for an insider’s view of this incident. 
23
 The lower average indirect cost rate for public universities does not imply 
that they spend less on research administration and infrastructure than their private 
counterparts. Rather, much of the funding they receive for infrastructure comes 
from their states in the form of financial support for buildings, and the states 
usually do not require their universities to recoup these costs and return them to 
the state government. Since faculty believe that high indirect cost rates result in 
a reduction in their probability of winning grants and/or a reduction in the amount 
of direct costs that they can apply for, they put pressure on public university 
administrators to keep their indirect cost rates low. The administrators have 
obliged, but, as state support became tighter in the 1990s, many publics allowed 
their indirect cost rates to float up a bit. Interestingly, the only study of the effect 
that indirect cost rates have on the size of direct cost awards and the probability 
of winning an award, Ehrenberg and Mykula (1999), found no evidence that 
faculty members’ perceptions about the adverse effects of high indirect rates are 
correct. 
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FIG. 7.—Indirect cost recovery rates at all research and doctoral institutions: 228 schools 
by institutional control. 
research universities, and, on average, for any given level of direct-cost 
research funding that their faculty members received, they received about 
8.3% fewer funds from the federal government to support their research 
infrastructure and administration in 1997 than they did in 1983. 
What is the likely response of an institution faced with such a reduction 
in external support for research infrastructure and administration? On 
the one hand, it might try to reduce its expenditure in these areas to match 
the decline in the external support it was receiving. But such a strategy 
would alienate its faculty, who would see the institution’s commitment 
to research declining.24 In addition, if reductions were made in areas in 
which the institution was not spending more than the maximum that the 
federal government permitted it to charge, the federal auditors would 
respond by further reducing its indirect cost rate in the next year. Hence 
the university would get a double whammy—irate faculty, and still lower 
indirect cost revenue the next year. So invariably administrators made up 
the reduction in external funding for research administration and infra-
structure out of institutional funds. 
The reduction in indirect cost rates for external research has been 
matched in recent years by increasing pressure on institutions to provide 
“matching” institutional funds for any research proposals that they sub-
mit. Put another way, to compete for external funding, institutions in-
creasingly had to bear a share of the direct costs of their faculty members’ 
research out of their own pockets. This further increased institutional 
costs for research. 
24
 Picture a Cornell provost contemplating the length of his future tenure in 
office if he announced to the faculty that he was going to reduce the budget of 
the library by $3.5 million dollars because the federal government had reduced 
the support that it had provided for the library budget by that amount (which it 
did one year). 
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Finally, as scientists’ equipment became more expensive and the com-
petition for top-quality young scientists intensified, the start-up funds 
that universities needed to provide to attract young scientists and engi-
neers increased. By the late 1990s it was not unusual to find universities 
providing $500,000–$1,000,000 of funding to young scientists to help 
them set up their laboratories. The costs of attracting distinguished senior 
scientists were even larger. 
How have universities responded to the increasing importance and costs 
of science? One might expect that the growing importance of science has 
provided an incentive for universities to allocate a greater share of their 
faculty positions or faculty salary dollars to scientists. However, using 
data from a set of liberal arts colleges at leading private research univer-
sities, a study that Julia Epifantseva and I conducted found, on balance, 
that over a recent 20-year period neither the share of faculty positions 
nor the share of the faculty salary budget devoted to the sciences in these 
research universities’ liberal arts colleges had systematically increased dur-
ing the period (Ehrenberg and Epifantseva 2001). Controlling for the 
growth of enrollments in the various disciplines or for whether overall 
faculty size was increasing or decreasing did not alter these conclusions. 
Of course, it may well be that the increasing costs of science are felt 
throughout a university’s budget. To the extent that more funds from 
annual giving and endowment income are directed toward support of the 
scientific infrastructure, it may put upward pressure on undergraduate 
tuitions or cause cutbacks in other areas. Since the faculty salary bill 
represents a large chunk of institutional costs, it is possible that the in-
creased costs of science are distributed throughout the university in the 
form of slower rates of increase in faculty salaries and/or slower rates of 
growth of faculty employment than would otherwise be the case, all other 
factors held constant. 
In research in progress, Michael Rizzo and I have tried to test for the 
effects of the increased costs of science on faculty salary and employment 
levels using panel data and models similar to those discussed earlier. Using 
22 years of data and a panel of 228 research and doctoral institutions, we 
estimate whether the average faculty salary level at an institution or its 
student/full-time faculty ratio is related to the level of its research ex-
penditures per faculty member out of institutional funds, after one con-
trols for institutional and year fixed effects, endowment per student, an-
nual giving per student, undergraduate tuition levels, state appropriations 
per student, and enrollment. While we find no evidence that more rapidly 
increasing institutional research expenditures are associated with slower 
growth rates in average faculty salaries, we do find strong evidence that 
they are associated with increases in the institutions’ student/full-time 
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faculty ratio.25 On average, holding all other factors constant, an increase 
in institutional research expenditures of $10,000 per faculty member (in 
real terms) is associated with an increased student/faculty ratio of close 
to one. Moreover, the magnitude of this relationship is larger at the private 
research universities, where declines in indirect cost rates have occurred.26 
Of course, reducing the total number of faculty salary across all fields 
may not be the only route via which the increased costs and importance 
of science are felt at universities. It is possible that in spite of the increased 
demand for teaching placed on colleges of arts and sciences at these in-
stitutions, as professional programs require more and more liberal arts 
courses, that the share of faculty positions in major private research uni-
versities going to colleges of arts and sciences has declined over time as 
the shares going to more colleges that are much more heavily oriented 
toward scientific research, such as engineering and medicine, have in-
creased. This conjecture cannot be tested in a straightforward manner 
because external research funding provides the support for a large fraction 
of faculty positions in some universities in engineering and medical 
colleges. 
The growth of science may have crowded out things other than faculty 
at universities. For example, increased institutional provision of research 
assistants for the scientists may have led to the decreased availability of 
internal funds to support teaching assistants in the humanities or social 
sciences. Or increased institutional support for scientific research facilities 
and start-up costs for scientists may have reduced the funding that oth-
erwise would have been available for travel and other “perks” in the 
humanities and the social sciences. Research on the impact of science on 
the university is clearly still in its infancy. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
The study of academic labor markets by economists has encompassed 
many more topics than I have touched upon. For example, because faculty 
salary data are often public information and measures of productivity can 
sometimes be developed, labor economists have estimated how faculty 
productivity varies with age, whether faculty salaries are tied to produc-
tivity, and the extent that gender and racial/ethnic differences in faculty 
salaries and promotion probabilities exist (Hamermesh, Johnson, and 
Weisbrod 1982; Oster and Hamermesh 1998; Monks and Robinson 2000; 
25
 Our faculty salary results are very preliminary because we have yet to solve 
the endogeneity problem posed by faculty salary levels being a major determinant 
of research costs. 
26
 Our estimates suggest, then, that undergraduate tuition dollars are increas-
ingly being used to subsidize research in the sense that higher student/full-time 
faculty ratios imply fewer courses offered, larger class sizes, more use of teaching 
assistants, and/or more use of adjunct and other part-time faculty. 
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Booth, Frank, and Blackaby 2001). We have investigated whether uni-
versities have monopsony power in the market for senior professors, built 
models to provide explanations for the tenure system, and estimated 
whether there are compensating wage differentials for low tenure prob-
abilities (Ransom 1993; Hallock 1995; Ehrenberg, Pieper, and Willis 1998; 
Siow 1998; McPherson and Schapiro 1999; Monks and Robinson 2001). 
We have studied how the end of mandatory retirement has influenced 
faculty retirement behavior and estimated the effectiveness of retirement 
incentive programs for faculty (Ashenfelter and Card 2001; Clark, Ghent, 
and Krebs 2001; Ehrenberg, Matier, and Fontanella 2001; Pencavel 2001). 
We have estimated the impact of unions on faculty salaries and working 
conditions, as well as on college and university staff members’ salaries, 
and tried to infer the values of university trustees from studying the 
compensation changes of university presidents (Barbezat 1989; Rees 1993, 
1994; Ehrenberg, Cheslock, and Epifantseva 2001; Klaff and Ehrenberg 
2002). In spite of all of these contributions, research on academic labor 
markets and, more generally, the economics of higher education is still at 
an early stage. I hope that this article will encourage more economists to 
study these issues. 
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